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ABSTRACT
Whilst user- and people-centered design are accepted routes
for digital services, they are less commonly used in the design
of technologies that control access to data and the security of
information. The ubiquity of both technology and programmes
such as “digital by default” as well as the weaving of digital
systems into the everyday fabric of society, create an envi-
ronment in which people and technology become enmeshed.
Such an environment might be termed “post-digital” and its
security is dependent on a people-centered approach to its de-
sign. In this paper we present a study that uses critical design
techniques coupled with critical security analysis to examine
how security might be approached in a post-digital context.
We call for a paradigm shift towards a people-centered se-
curity practice and using a case study then make practical
recommendations as to how this shift might be achieved.
Author Keywords
post-digital; post-digital security; lived experience; critical
security design
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; •Human-centered computing→ User studies;
INTRODUCTION
In the study and practice of technological security, the mantra
“users are the weakest link” has been hard to disrupt and it
reflects how people are often problematised when techno-
logical security is practised. From this perspective, people
are regarded as a point of weakness, as a vulnerability to be
exploited by attackers and malicious code, rather than as a
source of strength; a position that, in the last few years, has
been called into question by the UK’s National Centre for
Cyber Security (NCSC) [73]. Adams and Sasse [2] started
to disrupt this narrative twenty years ago with their seminal
paper Users are Not the Enemy and work in this tradition
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inspired a shift in the focus of national security guidance in
the UK [72]. However, sociotechnical studies are still at the
margins of technological security research and practice. Yet
the widespread adoption of digital technology across society,
digital by default modes of service delivery and the embed-
ding of smart devices into everyday scenarios have woven
issues of technological security into day to day life. This in-
terweaving of the digital into the fabrics of society is termed
by Cramer [29] as “post-digital”. The post-digital brings with
it the need for renewed forms of security where the links be-
tween human, societal and technological securities are a clear
part of the analysis and design. In this paper, we use the term
“post-digital security” for forms of sociotechnical security that
address issues of trust, identity, privacy and security in post-
digital contexts and societies through identity management,
human relations and trust as well as technological security
mechanisms.
In this paper, we present a case study that deploys a critical
approach to examining security in a post-digital scenario, and
reflect on how such an approach can be used to transform cur-
rent security practice. Critical design is dialogic, perspective-
shifting, creates holistic understandings and is reflexive [7].
The case study is designed using these principles and in its
data analysis uses four critical security questions posited by
Smith [82], a political theorist, to reflect upon what the data
tell us about post-digital security practice.
As a start point, we call for three shifts in security practice to
better address the post-digital:
• Shifting from telling people what makes them secure, to-
wards discussing with them what their concerns are and
what they regard as secure.
• Shifting from treating people as passive recipients of se-
curity awareness training, towards their becoming active
participants in post-digital security learning.
• Shifting from “one size fits all” engagement techniques used
for all groups within an organisation, towards the adaptation
of engagement styles to each group.
In the literature review below, we examine how usable security
scholarship and together with the wider HCI scholarship that
relates to the security of people, communities and societies
help us to facilitate this shift.
RELATED LITERATURE
The importance of designing usable and people-centered se-
curity is a clear theme in the technological security scholar-
ship [42, 32]. In early work, Zurko [92] called for usability
testing to be applied to secure systems, security models to be
developed for user-friendly systems and for user needs to be
considered as a primary design goal in security system design.
This work has continued over the last two and a half decades
and some of this scholarship is represented below.
Scholarship into Practice
In the UK, HCI’s usable security scholarship has been an im-
portant factor in encouraging a policy-driven shift towards
people-centered security design and practice [73]. For exam-
ple, in 2019 the NCSC in the UK launched guidance titled You
Shape Security [64]. The breadth of this guidance reflects how
usable security has inspired a wide range of sociotechnical
security research. The guidance is primarily developed from
UK people-centered security research and includes references
to the authors’ creative security research [25].
The You Shape Security guidance is primarily written for se-
curity practitioners: both those who design approaches to
technical security within organisations and those who deploy
and manage those approaches [46]. The guidance focuses
on the message that for people to engage and comply with
security technologies and practices, there has to be a clear
benefit to them [77]. Yet it also recognises that identifying and
agreeing upon such benefits is complex, requires negotiation
and will differ between people. The guidance focuses on five
types of engagement methods that security practitioners can
use when engaging with different parts of an organisation to
discuss and agree the relevant benefits of technology and as
well as the concomitant security. These methods are:
• Security incident and near miss reporting: identified as a
way for security practitioners to specify the areas in which
engagement might be needed.
• Surveys: to capture the senses of security and the different
concerns across an organisation. This brings to the fore
methods of surveys and mass-interview techniques [78,
47].
• Conversations with people: to be used by security practi-
tioners to engage with people and to listen to their concerns
as well as impart specialist knowledge. This technique is
informed by security dialogues research [5].
• Creative narratives: this technique foregrounds the narra-
tives of everyday experiences of security [38, 57].
• Creative engagement techniques: a family of tech-
niques [25] designed to question understandings of security
in any given context and to promote spaces in which alter-
native perspectives on security can be heard.
In the following subsections, we set out the background HCI
and sociotechnical security research literature that underpins
this guidance. The breadth of this literature reflects the many
different aspects of HCI that have influenced the direction of
security practice.
Trust and Technological Security
You Shape Security guidance has the building of trust relation-
ships at its core, showing how security as both a technology
and a service rely on many forms of trust. User-centered se-
curity is sometimes also referred to as trust user experience
(TUX) [14] emphasising this. Whilst trust has long been cited
as fundamental to a successful society [59], it does not carry
a uniform meaning across all disciplinary positions. This is
highlighted by Mollering [61], who outlines three schools of
thought on trust: trust as reason, trust as routine and trust as re-
flexive. These are all tied to different disciplinary frameworks,
ranging from psychology and a rational choice perspective,
e.g. [45], to economic theories of trust focusing on limiting risk
exploitation [86], along with broader sociological theorising
on trust [56].
Whilst there have been calls for broader, sociological con-
ceptualisations to be included in information security’s un-
derstanding of trust [41, 79], much usable security research
takes a psychological position on trust, one where trust is a
rational choice – a decision – rather than a social construction.
Moreover, trust in the digital context is problematic [84] – not
least because the social norms and cultural practices that are
needed to support trust interactions are harder to identify in on-
line environments. The difficulty of mapping the social norms
of the physical world with those experienced in the online
world is exacerbated by online anonymity [60]. Anonymity
creates the possibility of being able to violate social norms
in online behaviours without being held accountable in the
physical world. The difficulty of reading and interpreting such
norms in online interactions, is, for example, one of the factors
exploited in phishing attacks [34]. Nevertheless, it is argued
that trust in online environments is possible [87] and usable
security researchers have long argued that trust is a central
component of effective security [41, 71, 53].
In a post-digital context, trust is formed as much by the inter-
actions taking place around the technology as by the elements
that form the digital interaction [51, 65]. A post-digital se-
curity therefore needs sociological understandings of trust
to anticipate security responses and actions. Such a security
also requires an understanding of the embodied sense of trust
and technology to complement and contextualise the more
traditional notion of trust in components [1] and trust in the
transactions between those components [43]. This is because
“[t]rust in everyday life is a mix of feelings and rational think-
ing” [56].
In summary, sociotechnical security research has examined
primarily examined trust in technological components and
transactions between those components. A post-digital secu-
rity needs to also further develop understandings of embodied
senses of trust and trust as a sociological reality in order to
shape and anticipate the patterns of enmeshed sociotechnical
technical practices.
Challenges with Compliance
Encouraging people to follow security rules and policies is
an important aspect of security practice and is a key focus
for the security practitioner community. Understanding bar-
riers to the following of security rules has been a persistent
line of enquiry in usable security scholarship. Renaud [70]
highlighted that complex technological controls have a higher
risk of not being complied with. She also demonstrates that
environmental factors such as work stress, lack of clarity in
security policies, and unrealistic task demands, all contribute
to increasing the risk of accidental non-compliance. Unre-
alistic task demands have been explored as a key reason for
non-compliance, with Blythe [16] terming these demands “re-
sponse costs” and pointing out that the cost for people can be
time, money and effort.
Research has highlighted that poorly designed security tech-
nology and badly implemented security programmes lead to
a ‘compliance overhead’ [11] and that the true cost of this
overhead is rarely calculated [47]. It is asserted that the true
cost of ill-fitting security – that which does not meet the needs
of people – is difficult to assess, because compliance is not a
single behaviour [16] and because there are a great many fac-
tors that influence compliance. Blythe [16] lists these factors
as:
• Self-efficacy which is an individual’s belief about their own
ability to perform a security task or exert an influence over
it.
• Social influence which is the extent to which an individual’s
behaviour is influenced by others.
• Attitude towards the task.
• Perceived susceptibility towards a security threat against
which the task is designed to protect.
• Perceived severity of the threat.
• Response efficacy which is the extent to which a task is
regarded as an adequate response to the threat.
• Response cost which is the time, money and effort required
to deploy the task.
Sasse et al.’s [47] research also shows that complex password
rules not only impact on an individual’s productivity but can
also lead to security workarounds. Some usable security schol-
ars, however, argue that workarounds are not necessarily an
inferior option [8]. For example, Woltjer’s research [90] shows
that workarounds differ as to whether they are innovative se-
curity practices that run parallel to the security policies, or
whether they are trade-offs that reduce security in favour of
efficiency. It has been further argued that ‘shadow security
practices’ – those that do not conform with security policy
but that nevertheless provide security – are indeed a form
of people-centered security design [53]. Workarounds and
divergent security practices can result from a lack of com-
mon practice and usage goals. Karlsson [50] argues that the
deployment of technology and the removal of face-to-face in-
teractions can engender conflicted situations in which security
practices will diverge. Research [6, 5] indicates that security
practice therefore needs to pay careful attention to dialogue
and engagement techniques as methods that can build the nec-
essary common understandings and identify conflict as well
as consensus around technology goals.
In summary, the usable security scholarship on compliance
and workarounds provides important lessons for post-digital
security. As this literature shows, non-compliance and di-
vergent security practices are more likely when people have
different understandings of the usage and benefit of technology.
In summary, the lessons from studies of compliance highlight
the need to communicate benefit of technology use if safe and
secure practices are to follow. The communication of benefit
is not a one-way dissemination of information. Post-digital
security will need to build new understandings of not only
benefit but also what it means to be secure in a digital context.
Security as a Contested Concept
A main theme in usable security scholarship has been towards
making existing expert security knowledge comprehensible
and usable to people. Such literature rarely focuses on ev-
eryday, non-expert conceptualisations of security, choosing
instead to consider expert conceptualisations. Moreover, in in-
formation security terms, this builds on the belief that security
knowledge held at “the top” is also the “correct” knowledge
and that this knowledge will naturally produce effective in-
formation security policies and practices. By contrast, the
importance of understanding everyday or “ground-up" forms
of security has been recognised in wider security studies which
have used the term "security from below" [24, 33] to argue
for security policies about people rather than institutions [17].
This encompasses social, cultural, economic and political no-
tions of protection. Wolff [89], a security scholar, made the
observation that the purpose of security policies is simulta-
neously accepted and contested. This is because conceptual-
isations of security are many and varied [89] partly because
different communities foreground different objects that need
to be protected. For example, Nissenbaum [66] and Hansen
and Nissenbaum [44] point out that computer security priori-
tises the protection of technology and data, foregrounding the
threats to these elements accordingly; state security will focus
on the protection of the state and sovereignty, foreground-
ing those threats accordingly. Similarly, citizens will focus
on the threats to themselves and their kin and friendship net-
works [83], in a form of everyday security that differs from
the security concerns of the state or security specialists. These
meanings also evolve and change over an individual’s life-
time [48].
The ground-up perspective is essential if post-digital security
is to resonate with everyday lived experience. In order to rep-
resent everyday lived security experience, observed practices
‘in the wild’ [74, 37] need to be identified and understood.
Studies of practices in the wild show that people engage with
technological security not in isolation but as part of everyday
technological practices [36]. Security practices in the wild
are potentially challenging to the more orthodox conceptu-
alisations of technological security as the emerging security
concerns are often different to and sometimes conflict with
expert understandings of technological security [26]. Every-
day security practices [37] are partly grounded in the everyday
security concerns of the individual and responded to through a
routinisation and everyday practices [26, 31].
Understanding how everyday routines and rhythms create a
sense of security are important in a post-digital context, where
the boundaries between people and technology are blurred.
HCI research that focuses on understanding the security of
people and how that relates to technology (rather than vice
versa) is essential to better understand this socio-material rela-
tionship. Research grounded in HCI’s ethnographic, situated
traditions [35] are important for developing an understand-
ing of the security of people. Such work is a bridge to HCI
scholarship that focuses on human relational responses to se-
curity. Examples of HCI scholarship that look at the use of
social relationships as a response to technological security
issues include: Vines et al.’s [88] and Sleeper et al.’s [81]
work on financial security, Ogbonnaya-Ogburu et al.’s [67]
and Mentis et al.’s [58] work on safe digital inclusion and
Corbett and Le Dantec’s [27] work on trust and digital civics.
Vines et al.’s [88] work shows how financial security, techno-
logical security and human security are intertwined and also
foregrounds the relevance of socio-materiality in relation to
feelings of security. Ogbonnaya-Ogburu et al.’s [67] work
shows how access to services is far more complex than simply
having technological availability and that feelings of insecurity
shape online practices. Corbett and Le Dantec [27] reflect on
the importance of trust relationships and its relevance to the
successful deployment of technology.
In summary, by connecting technological security scholarship
with the scholarship that is more focused on social and human
relational responses to technological security, a post-digital se-
curity scholarship emerges where security is no longer simply
framed as an individualistic issue and activity but also as an is-
sue that affects communities and as an activity in which people
co-operate. Acts of co-operation and community response are
a necessary response to security issues in post-digital contexts.
SECURITY IN A POST-DIGITAL CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a case study designed to critically
evaluate what sort of security is both needed and achieved
in a post-digital setting. Molotch [62], a sociologist, who
studied security in the wild argued: “The bottom line for the
security of anything – hardware, software, airports or subways
– is the same. Dig deep into how people actually operate in
the everyday including the ways they already solve problems,
particularly those to do with safety.” The approach taken in
this case study is designed to enable participants to dig deep
by creating a safe-space in which participants can create a
detailed narrative of everyday technology use and critically
examine what they discover.
The use of IoT for the monitoring of people was set as the
context within which the participants worked. This is a context
in which the security of people and the security of technology
are physically and technologically interwoven [68]. In order
to compare different framings of security in this post-digital
context, two very different perspectives were selected; secu-
rity practitioners and healthcare service providers. In the case
of the security practitioners, the use of IoT to monitor staff
was the given scenario. In the case of the healthcare service
providers, the use of IoT by patients to self-manage health
conditions was the given scenario. The case studies illustrate
how the themes of the literature review: issues of trust, com-
pliance and workarounds and competing conceptualisations
of security can play out in a post-digital scenario.
A physical (LEGO) modelling approach was chosen as
the main engagement method because it creates “rich pic-
tures” [63], thus, encouraging participants to reflect on the
ways in which technology is woven into their everyday prac-
tices. A critical security engagement challenges the assump-
tions about what it means to be secure and how security is
achieved. The approach was deployed using critical design
principles [7] that foster a reflexive, dialogic approach and that
promote a holistic understanding of security situated in a par-
ticular context. This approach promotes an understanding of
technologies that are attentive to the wider political economy
of technology deployment [40, 39].
Study Design and Methods
The study approach used can be situated amongst an estab-
lished body of related scholarly literature [20, 75, 21, 80]
and commercial practice [69] and is based on “creative secu-
rity” [38], a technique for participative and playful engage-
ment. Creating a safe space where participants can explore
their concerns and imagine alternative futures is an important
principle of creative engagement. Trust is fundamental to
this type of participatory engagement [23] and much can be
learned from the trust principles of participatory practice in a
civic setting, see for example the work in [18, 23].
The case study has one common study design but is enacted
in two parts: (1) an engagement with security practitioners
and (2) an engagement with healthcare service providers. As
noted above, this is a context in which the security of people
and the security of technology are physically and logically
interwoven in a post-digital setting. In terms of participant
selection: security practitioners were recruited in order to ex-
plore technology protection practices in a post-digital setting;
that healthcare service providers were recruited so to the se-
curity practices of a group interested in the use of IoT but
whose focus is patient care not technological protection. This
participant recruitment was intended to give both a ‘top-down’
and ‘ground-up’ perspective of post-digital security.
Session Structure
We used the following standardised engagement protocol with
both participating groups. After introducing the study, we ran
a short brainstorming session where participants responded to
prompts constructed to encourage the critical examination of
the security of the context (see Table 1).
Participants used story sheets to capture their ideas in response
to such prompts. Then we introduced the LEGO modelling
component where participants worked on the scenarios and
issues raised during the initial brainstorming segment.
The term “security” was left very broad to draw out the broader
themes from the literature review. The post-digital scenario
was designed to encourage participants to engage with these
themes and enabled researchers to explore how the impor-
tance of trust relationships, compliance and workarounds and
the negotiation of alternative conceptualisations of security
emerge in a post-digital scenario. The prompts, questions
and scenarios were deliberately chosen to facilitate this broad
discussion.
Prompts
Prompt 1 “What is smart monitoring technology?”
Prompt 2 “What services do smart monitoring
technology provide?”
Prompt 3 “What security issues does smart monitoring
technology introduce and why?”
Prompt 4 “What are the possible responses to those
security issues introduced by smart
monitoring technology, and whom do they
benefit and disbenefit?”
Table 1. Prompts used during brainstorming sessions.
Security Practitioners: 55 security practitioners were recruited
to participate in a workshop at the CyberUK conference in
2016. The security practitioners were split into ten groups
with five to six participants per group. The groups were de-
liberately set so that in each group there was a mixture of
different types of security practice such as auditing, security
architecture design, risk and governance. Each group worked
around a table and groups appointed a facilitator, a scribe to
make notes and the remaining three to four participants were
model makers. Each group was given a box of LEGO and
a grey LEGO baseboard. Each group was also given a set
of instructions, as shown in Figure 1, for building the model
together with a suggestion as to how the different coloured
bricks might be used; for example: one colour to represent
data, one colour to represent digital hardware and one colour
to represent physical environments. The groups were also
given Post-It notes, blank design cards and paper tape that
could be used by the group to annotate the model.
Figure 1. The instructions given to participants show the colour schema
for the LEGO bricks that they were invited to use.
To stimulate discussion, each group was given the same Dilbert
cartoon about staff monitoring [3]. In the cartoon, Dilbert is
surprised to learn that his every movement is monitored and
processed through data gathered by a comprehensive array
of sensors in his workplace, including CCTV, eye-movement
tracking software, and biometrics.
Having read the cartoon and discussed it, each group was
asked to use the LEGO kits provided to them to model the
technical, security and social implications of IoT monitoring
as they saw it. Each group was asked to start by creating a
scenario that included IoT monitoring and populating this with
actors (represented by LEGO figures), using the schema of
LEGO bricks to represent the environment, as shown in Fig-
ure 1: noting the physical, technical and data elements. Each
group worked on their model for approximately 45 minutes
by working through the prompts and provocations (please see
Table 1) and then concluded with a summary of the opportu-
nities and challenges that arose in this context together with
ideas as to how the security issues of IoT monitoring might be
responded to.
Healthcare Service Providers: Participants in the healthcare
service provider workshop were recruited with the help of the
Health Foundry in London. 15 people took part. Four groups
of three to four people were set-up. As with the security practi-
tioners each group was provided with a LEGO kit comprising
a set of instructions, LEGO bricks, a grey baseboard, Post-It
notes and blank design cards. Each group appointed a facilita-
tor and a scribe, and sat around a table. Each group was asked
to consider the use of IoT to monitor health conditions.
Instead of a cartoon, a scenario was presented to stimulate
discussion. As with the security practitioners, each group was
asked to consider the technical, security and societal implica-
tions of IoT monitoring as they saw it. Each group was asked
to start by creating a scenario that included the use of IoT to
monitor a health condition in the home. This scenario was
modelled by using a schema of LEGO bricks to represent the
environment: noting the physical, technical and data elements.
The scenario was then populated with actors represented by
LEGO figures. Each group worked on their model for ap-
proximately 45 minutes by working through the prompts and
provocations (please see Table 1) and then concluded with a
summary of the opportunities and challenges that arose in this
context together with ideas as to how the security issues of
IoT monitoring might be responded to.
Data Gathering and Analysis
The data was gathered, processed and stored under ethical
approval from the academic institution. Data was generated
in the form of LEGO models, annotations made by individual
participants, facilitator observations, notes of collaborative
outcomes from the brainstorming, and final group-feedback
contributions. Additional data gathered for analysis included:
1) hand-written annotations placed on models by participants,
and text gathered from the story sheets, 2) investigator notes,
and 3) photographs of the models both individually and as
a collage. It was not possible to audio-record the security
practitioner session because some preferred not to be recorded
due to the nature of their job but it was possible to record the
healthcare service provider session. The recording of this ses-
sion was transcribed and then the photographic documentation
was combined with the transcriptions. We used inductive the-
matic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke [19] and two
researchers independently coded the themes and then jointly
resolved thematic conflicts. We included analysis of the visual
data using Gillian Rose’s analytical approach to understanding
visual data [76]. The themes were then interrogated from the
perspective of Smith’s four critical security questions [82]
in order to identify how the workshop findings challenge as-
sumptions and understandings related to information security
practice. These four questions are [82]:
• Who or what needs to be secured?
• What is doing the securing?
• Why is the subject being secured?
• Who or what is the subject being secured from?
In this way, a critical security perspective was maintained
during analysis.
A short illustrated report was produced from each workshop
that outlined the workshop conclusions. The report was sent
to a representative of each participant group for discussion
and feedback. Written feedback was given by the participant
groups and was incorporated into the final analysis and find-
ings.
FINDINGS
The following themes were identified from the analysis:
• Security Issues. Much of the response from the security
practitioners focused on the inherent threat of not being
in control. This manifested itself in a sense of being over-
whelmed with the volume of data, and also of not being able
to create a protected and stable perimeter around the technol-
ogy itself. This relates to the theme of trust in technology,
highlighting the potential threat produced by a destabilising
lack of trust in security technology capabilities.
• Who Secures? Both groups questioned central premises,
such as: who or what is making these contexts secure?
Both groups concluded that the technological responses
were only a part of any answer to this question, and that
social interaction plays an equally important and necessary
securing function. This theme sheds further light on why
’workarounds’ might appear in order to mitigate deficits in
security technology capabilities, and highlights the impor-
tance of human and social relationships in securing these
contexts.
• Benefits and Disbenefits. Both groups identified that estab-
lishing, agreeing and communicating the benefits of IoT
monitoring were important processes for the establishment
of why security was needed and in what form. It is through
this dialogic process that alternative conceptualisations of
security are both identified and reconciled.
The questioning of security brought forward not only issues
of technological security but also human and societal security.
There were also issues of job security, in the case of security
practitioners, and also questions of organisational security.
The discussions in both groups around "who or what is doing
the securing?" show how these securities become enmeshed in
each other and must be responded to holistically if post-digital
contexts are to be secure.
What security issues are introduced and why?
Both groups felt threatened by the unknown. Analysing the
responses from the critical security perspective of “who or
what is the threat?”, both groups felt threats from technology
that had been implemented to support and help. For example,
security practitioners reported feeling overwhelmed with data.
The different groups focused on the immense difficulties of
managing complex oversized data flows and that the monitor-
ing of data had added to this complexity. For the participants,
the data is complex, composed of lots of input streams – none
of which are complete and which have different levels of ver-
ification. “Too much information, distracted, bad decisions”
reads one of the labels added to a model (Figure 3).
Being deluged in data was also regarded as a potential threat
to the mental health of those whose job it is to use that data
to protect environments: “The data is everywhere and coming
from all angles” (Figure 2). There was a strong sense that this
was an environment that security specialists did not properly
understand, and for that reason it was difficult to see how the
environment could be harnessed for the good. One annotation
read: “Internet of Things = Unknown”.
The threat that emerged from the opening up of the environ-
ment was a particular concern: “IoT third parties are able to
open gates”. This opening up of the environment can also re-
sult in accidental disclosure. Security practitioners conceived
of situations where this might come from attackers mixing dis-
parate streams of data, including IoT monitoring, to filter and
make sense of data to achieve further intelligence on attack
goals. This sense of openness was also echoed by the health-
care service providers, who argued that there were “too many
logon opportunities” in an IoT monitoring infrastructure.
Healthcare service providers also focused on potential threats
from the unknown, but from the perspective of a lack of leg-
ibility of the data not from the perspective of too much data.
It was felt that lack of transparency and accountability (both
perceived and actual) might act as a barrier to wider adoption
of health monitoring tools, even where there are recognised po-
tential benefits to patient health. Healthcare service providers
argued that different perspectives need to be taken into ac-
count in order to develop a fuller understanding of the entire
problem space around IoT in healthcare. They argued that this
multi-perspectival view could reduce the number of unknowns
by identifying not only a wider range of issues but also a wider
range of potential responses and greater resilience, as was
vividly represented in the avenues converging on the patient
in the ’Perspectives on Care’ model (Figure 4).
Who or What is Doing The Securing?
Both groups engaged critically with the question of what
would offer protection in this scenario. Security practition-
ers were better able to state what was not doing the securing
rather than what was. Their responses showed that they viewed
technological controls as being less effective. They argued
that the sheer volume of data could overwhelm and make the
security controls less effective in this context. Some data path-
ways remained manageable to the security practitioners but
faced with the complexity of the situation, small blue loose
LEGO parts, representing ’Open source unverified data’, were
scattered liberally over the model to reflect the difficulty of
identifying every data path (see Figure 2). It was said that
data was everywhere and that there was no possibility at all
of mapping it, both in the LEGO model and also in security
practice. In a sense, the limitations of modelling in LEGO the
complexity of post-digital contexts were also a metaphor for
the difficulties of managing the security implications of IoT
monitoring.
Figure 2. A security practitioner model: ’Too Much Information’. The
modellers created their own handwritten colour-code (below) for infor-
mation flows seen in the overhead view (above). This shows how these
flows interact with one another. Pink tiles and smaller pieces denote ’HR
Monitoring data’ captured within an organisation recording the activi-
ties of its own workforce.
It was explained that the superfluity of data was a problem
for security practice, as such practice relies on being able to
identify flows of data in order to verify and protect those flows
with technological controls. As a result, IoT monitoring can
create as many (if not more) risks than it resolved because the
technological controls were unable to identify and respond to
issues of unauthorised data access and unauthorised modifi-
cation of either the primary data flows or the additional data
flows introduced through monitoring (or both).
Security practitioners also revealed a sense of frustration that
these difficulties could not be communicated to management.
Their reflections also showed a sense of a lack of agency, in
that security specialists felt they could not push back on the use
of IoT monitoring. This sense of lack of agency was articulated
as follows: “Controls budget; blown on the wrong things”,
and “Yellow [bricks] = distilled lies sent to management.”
By contrast, the healthcare service providers focused on the
importance of different types of accessibility and saw acces-
sibility as a means of securing people and technology and
building community and individual resilience. Healthcare ser-
vice providers stated that an approach to technological design
was needed that made data use transparent to users, informed
Figure 3. Details of the ’Too Much Information’ security practitioner
model. A manager sits amidst enormous stacks of blue data, annota-
tions reading ’I don’t care, Na, na’; ’Garbage In - Garbage Out’; ’Con-
trols budget blown on wrong things’; ’Too much information, distracted,
bad decisions.’ An analyst is mired in loose pink data (’HR Monitoring
data’). Below, an analyst attempts to make sense of the data using bar
charts, with little success: pink tiles read: ’No’.
by active consent and clear accountability and that this would
secure people. Technology, not yet available, needed to be in
place so that trust could be built through regular feedback and
updates to users on how their data is being used.
Healthcare service providers also highlighted another weak-
ness with the technical controls, not mentioned by security
practitioners. Whilst the security practitioners focused on the
superfluity of the data, the healthcare service providers were
worried that some data would be blocked or unavailable due
to problems related to interoperability between systems, and
across the different data types being worked with. Focus there-
fore also had to be on delivering fully supported data sharing
infrastructures as a means to secure the scenario.
Benefits and Disbenefits of IoT Monitoring
Both groups felt that if harnessed correctly, monitoring could
increase creativity and open up opportunities for new ways of
working as shown in Figure 4. However, both groups were
critical of what was actually being secured, and why.
Figure 4. A healthcare service provider model: ’Perspectives on Care’.
In the centre is the user of IoT devices and services in healthcare, sur-
rounded by several avenues (family, GP, CCG (Clinical Commission-
ing Group), dietitian, cardiologist, pharmacist, insurance firms, gyms,
etc) holding data about that person and which may be relevant to their
healthcare. Below, the sub-group of healthcare service providers build
and discuss their model, while other sub-groups work on theirs nearby.
Security practitioners felt that the monitoring scenario was
one that opened up the possibility of wider social risks. One
security practitioner annotated their model with the reflection
“Staff sue company for discrimination/human rights”, a risk
stemming from personally identifiable information becom-
ing compromised. Healthcare service providers considered
how this risk could be reduced through the use of monitor-
ing needs to be culturally sympathetic and supportive, and
the interpretation of the resulting data needs to be both prag-
matic and consultative with that community. Healthcare ser-
vice providers also felt that public and private stakeholders
in healthcare delivery must be prepared to have their existing
business models questioned and opened up. Transactions with
the user will need to be renegotiated in order to make the basis
of the relationship (and exchange) clearer.
Security practitioners put forward the view that IoT monitor-
ing data could be harnessed to improve morale – relieving
Figure 5. A healthcare service provider model: ’The Future Fridge.’
Left, the initial state, a user with a standard white fridge. Right, the after
state, where the user has adopted an internet-connected ’smart’ fridge.
Annotations on this model included: ’Demonstrable benefit: What’s the
use to me?’; ’Who is seeing the data?’; ’How can we safeguard vulner-
able people?’; ’Want the IoT landscape to operate in an ethical way’.
Below: The five prospective users of healthcare IoT (on a spectrum of fit-
ness, health, and early adoption). Other annotations read: ’Fridge stores
food->user clear on it’s purpose,’ and ’Fridge does not give out any infor-
mation.’ ’Businesses are scared of making a mistake’; ’Need open stan-
dards e.g. Creative Commons license’; ’Is there a role for Blockchain
in IoT security/data’; ’Need flexibility so that what you create today is
relevant tomorrow.’
workplace inefficiencies, inconveniences and frustrations, and
potentially leading to innovations and alternatives being of-
fered to these common problems. The end result, it was said,
would be improved resilience and defence against data attack.
Similarly, healthcare professionals thought that IoT monitor-
ing for health could “bring the world” to older people whose
data is vulnerable: explaining the benefits of IoT technolo-
gies was seen as an important means of gaining ’buy-in’ from
employees. Organisations, the security practitioner groups as-
serted, did not do enough to focus on the benefits to employees
and to identify creative uses for the data. Poor use of monitor-
ing data followed as a result, with detrimental effects on staff
and the creation of scenarios in which data was vulnerable
to attack. A similar point was also made by the healthcare
service providers, who strongly put forward the view that the
benefits of monitoring need to be made clear before people
would be willing to part with their data.
DISCUSSION
In this discussion we examine how a critical approach to secu-
rity design differs from an affirmative one and reflect on the
roles for each. We then examine why a critical approach is
useful in post-digital contexts. Finally, we outline the changes
a critical approach can bring to security practice and how the
HCI community can further strengthen such an approach.
Affirmative and Critical Approaches
The NCSC guidance [64] is a strong example of a shift towards
people-centered security practice and design. Nevertheless, the
framing of people-centered security still typically foregrounds
an affirmative design where expert-developed principles of
technology security are the basis for engagement between se-
curity practitioners and communities of technology users. In
contrast, the method deployed in the case study offers a critical
rather than an affirmative perspective. This approach creates
spaces in which the expert framing of post-digital security
issues can be challenged and a “ground-up” perspective can be
developed that frames the post-digital security challenges from
the perspective of those groups into whose lives the digital is
woven.
Much of the background literature section represents research
that is focused on ensuring that technological security works
more effectively and efficiently by being more compatible
with human practice. However, whilst such affirmative posi-
tions are important for the design of reliable technology and
services, such research gives little or no space for alternative
conceptualisations of post-digital security or security issues.
In order to achieve the goals of initiatives such as You Shape
Security [64], and to be fully people-centered, there has to be
space for such alternative conceptualisations and also for the
opportunity to question the value and assumptions of digital
security in any given setting.
In the case study, the security practitioners critically reflected
on the difficulties of working with and analysing what they
described as “too much data”. Their concern was not only
as to whether the human operators are able to cope with this
volume of data, but also whether the technological controls
themselves would be capable of processing this much data
in any kind of useful way. In this scenario, critical reflection
is opened up, not only to human practice but also to techno-
logical design itself. Thus, in response to the critical security
question “Who or what is doing the securing?”, the response
we observed is that security is not achieved through the gath-
ering of large amounts of data from tracking devices and other
similar technologies. Instead, the critical reflections from the
security practitioners highlight that technical controls on their
own are severely limited in a post-digital context, and that
human interactions promoting trust-building and resilience are
important to security practice.
The security practitioners also reflect that the challenge of too
much data is a message that is not welcomed by the leadership
of organisations. As a result of this wider political context, a
fiction had to be created and re-presented to an organisation’s
management, a fiction regarding who or what constitutes the
threat, and which represents the potency of data to respond to
that threat. The critical reflection revealed the acknowledged
role of these self-imposed fictions in reaffirming managerial as-
sumptions about the efficacy of existing security technologies
and practices.
The healthcare service providers critically reflected on who
or what needs to be protected, and who or what is the threat.
They call for transparency, indicating that the service providers
and technology companies are a perceived source of threat
themselves. As a result, they argue that service provider busi-
ness models should be opened up for review. The call for
transparency is a recurrent theme when trust in both the tech-
nology and the providers decreases and the demand for greater
control increases [91]. However, further critical reflection is
required as Kizilec’s [54] research has also shown that too
much transparency can result in the degradation of trust.
Both groups critically reflected on whether the technologi-
cal controls are able to provide sufficient protection. Conse-
quently, the groups considered how the wider social, political
and economic context might play a part in the security of
IoT monitoring. In both groups, there was a recognition that
if the narrative relating to the use of IoT monitoring is not
felt to be positive in nature, and if the design of the services
does not clearly benefit the people being monitored, there are
significant risks from people resisting such monitoring. This
critical reflection acknowledges the risks that flow from either
claiming benefits that are not present or from promoting a
negative frame that imposes monitoring. Consequently, the
dialogue used to frame technology benefits is an important
part of security practice.
Such critical reflections provide a multi-perspectival view of
what protections are needed and what protections are most
effective. With this understanding relevant security policies
and principles can be established and these may run counter
to orthodox security practices and principles.
Coming to Terms with Post-Digital Security
As the case study shows, the challenges of controlling and pro-
tecting data are amplified in the post-digital context, where the
use of digital technology in everyday life has become insepa-
rable from wider social and cultural practices. The post-digital
poses challenges for how we think about post-digital security
because it becomes harder to separate people into “them” and
“us”, as the case study demonstrates. As the evidence from the
security practitioners reveals, technologically controlling all
points of access in a post-digital context is an ineffective strat-
egy, is in part what makes this type of separation harder. The
findings from the case study suggest that just as post-digital
technology is enmeshed within wider cultural and social prac-
tices, so too must security become a techno-socio-cultural
response. However, the post-digital poses a challenge for
security because the extent to which a context is post-digital
depends in part on how people experience the technology. One
context can be post-digital for one person but not for another
resulting in multiple meanings and understandings of post-
digital security. For example one person can be oblivious to
sensor technology, whilst someone else may regard it as an
intrusive surveillance device. As a result, the post-digital is not
universally felt or experienced; as the post-digital advances,
more is asked of people-centered security design and of those
who inform and guide security practice.
The notion of a post-digital world thus challenges the separa-
tion between the physical/material and the virtual/immaterial,
which has also been highlighted by scholars in the field
of geography [52, 4] and more widely (e.g. [55, 49]). As
Cramer [29] notes, the “post” in “post-digital” does not nec-
essarily point to a time after digital technology or, as others
have suggested (e.g. [15, 13]), a rejection of digital technology
– what has been termed “the hipster’s dilemma” [85]. Rather,
Cramer [29] argues that the term “post-digital” refers to the
ways in which digital technology has become so intrinsically
interwoven into the fabrics of societies and into people’s daily
lives that it no longer makes sense as a standalone concept. To
this end, digitalisation has already happened [28].
Whilst much of the thinking related to the post-digital has
emerged from within digital arts and humanities and critical
theory [13, 12, 30, 22], the post-digital requires a rethink-
ing of security and of the processes of securing. Indeed,
the post-digital has a direct impact on how we understand
and relate to notions of post-digital security. Collapsing the
digital/non-digital divide requires an understanding of where
technological security is an embodied experience as much as a
technological solution; an understanding of technological and
individual security that allows for a broad conceptualisation
of security as well as a reflexive research approach. “Post-
digital security” therefore necessitates a discussion of whether
post-digital security has any meaning as a separate notion,
or whether the protection of technology and information has
become so intermingled with the protection of people and
society that distinguishing between the two is impossible. In
other words, in a post-digital society, technological security
rests upon the protection of people, and vice versa.
Implications for Security Practice
Usable security research, in common with other branches of
HCI, often struggle to identify and understand the limits of
technology [10]. As Baumer [9, 10] discusses, HCI has a
paucity of research on design for reflection and design that
acknowledges the limits of technology. However, as the above
case study illustrates, understanding the limits of security
technology and practice is key to developing effective security
strategies for post-digital environments.
Following this case study, the following practical changes
should be considered to security practice:
• Inclusion of critical security questions: information security
risk assessment should include critical security questions
of the type posed by Smith [82] when assessing risk to
data and technology in order to identify the communities
affected by these risks and the sources of those risks.
• Inclusion of ground-up as well as top-down perspectives:
security policies and processes should include ground-up
perspectives as well as top-down perspectives on security
practice in order to ensure that the security issues addressed
are representative of the communities using the technolo-
gies.
• The processes for setting and deploying security policies
should include opportunities for identifying both consensus
and conflict related to security goals and the benefits of
technology in a particular setting.
• Designing discussion fora and opportunities to learn from
alternative conceptualisations of security and its practice
in order to continuously develop a holistic and fluid under-
standings of post-digital security.
These are practical responses to the paradigm shift that is
called for in the Introduction. For in offering a means of
bringing together different understandings of security, new
responses can be created and appreciated.
Such an approach offers the possibility of a more holistic secu-
rity practice, one in which several branches of HCI scholarship
play a fundamental role. The security practitioner group fo-
cuses on the system and management perspective whereas
the healthcare service providers focus on the perspective of
the individual and of resilient collective action. By putting
together both perspectives, a more complete perspective is
achieved and, interestingly, one perspective might suggest
responses to challenges raised in the other perspective. For
example, the security practitioner’s view that the volume of
data would overwhelm the technological controls, is countered
by the healthcare service providers who propose that agree-
ing principles of use and sharing respond to those challenges
by fostering more trusted, resilient contexts of use. Thus a
people-centered approach to security practice is introduced
which encourages notions of security to be challenged; the
aim of which is to arrive at consensus as to the benefits and
meanings of security in context.
CONCLUSIONS
Questioning security and what it means to be secure in post-
digital contexts is key to identifying where there are differ-
ences in outlook and where these might lead to differences in
practice. Security practice then becomes not about imposing
a singular view of security on the use of technology but of
identifying and working with multiple views. The findings
also suggest a multi-perspectival approach is needed to avoid
the generic, universal approach to security that tends to dom-
inate. Looking at post-digital security practice through this
lens, NCSC’s You Shape Security guidance [64] becomes a
collection of tools to question the meanings of security in a
given context, converge on a set of understandings and respond
to those understandings. This is a radical departure from the
way that such approaches are typically framed: as techniques
for affirming the principles of technological security through
compliant practice.
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